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STRATEGIC RULEMAKING DISCLOSURE
Jennifer Nou and Edward H. Stiglitz *
Congressional enactments and executive orders instruct agencies to publish their anticipated rules in what is known as the Unified Agenda. The Agenda’s purpose is to ensure that political actors can monitor regulatory development. Agencies have come under fire in recent years, however, for conspicuous
omissions and irregularities. Critics allege that agencies hide their regulations
from the public strategically, that is, to thwart potential political opposition.
Others contend that such behavior is benign, perhaps the inevitable result of
changing internal priorities or unforeseen events.
To examine these competing hypotheses, this Article uses a new dataset
spanning over thirty years of rulemaking (1983-2014). Uniquely, the dataset is
drawn directly from the Federal Register. The resulting findings confirm that
agencies substantially under-report their rulemaking activities — about 70 percent of their proposed rules do not appear on the Unified Agenda before publication. Importantly, agencies also appear to disclose strategically with respect
to Congress, though not with respect to the President. The Unified Agenda is
thus not a successful tool for Congress to monitor and influence regulatory development. The results suggest that legislative, not executive, innovations may
help to augment public participation and democratic oversight, though the net
effects of more transparency remain uncertain. The findings also raise further
inquiries, such as why Congress does not render disclosure requirements judicially enforceable.
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INTRODUCTION
The regulatory process begins long before the notice of proposed rulemaking makes its public appearance. Drafting a proposed rule can take months,
even years, of internal debate and effort. 1 Agency staff must draft regulatory
text along with legal justifications and cost-benefit analyses. They must thus
gather the requisite data to make informed decisions. For this purpose, agencies
often invite informal input from potentially-affected interest groups and regulated entities. 2 These interactions, however, are often “informal and idiosyncrat1 See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 69-70 (2004) (finding
that average length of the proposal development period for the study’s 42 rules was more than 5 years).
2 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND POLICY 75-82 (4th ed. 2011); Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking
Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 281-85
(2004); West, supra note 1 at 69-70; Wendy Wagner et. al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of
EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110-13 (2011); William F. West, Inside the
Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y
576, 577 (2009) [hereinafter Black Box].
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ic.” 3 They can range from meetings with stakeholders to casual phone calls
with individual contacts. 4 These communications are rarely public and often
occur behind the scenes.5
Yet this stage of the rulemaking process — when agencies formulate their
agendas and policy proposals — is one of the most critical.6 Determining which
regulatory options are on-screen and off can shape the remainder of the rulemaking. Because of the pre-proposal period’s importance, both Congress and
the President have required agencies to notify the public more generally about
rules in the pipeline. In particular, these statutes and executive orders instruct
rulemaking agencies to publish their regulatory agendas every fall and spring,
essentially the regulations they anticipate issuing in the near future. Generally
speaking, these agenda entries should reveal planned regulatory actions for the
upcoming year, though agencies can disclose more long-term efforts as well.7
The Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC) then compiles these individual agendas into what is known as the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions (“Unified Agenda”).
Agencies have recently come under fire, however, for conspicuous omissions and irregularities. 8 Under President George W. Bush, Democratic legislators questioned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s failure to
include a regulation regarding risk assessments in the Agenda as “highly unu3 West, Black Box, supra note 2, at 577.
4 See id. at 591.
5 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 71 (2013) (noting that “research on the preproposal stage of the rule development process
has traditionally been impeded by a lack of information; Administrative Procedure Act docketing and other
transparency requirements are generally limited to the period after publication of the proposed rule”).
6 Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 67
ADMIN L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (noting that the state preceding rule promulgation and
enforcement “is one where some of the most critical decisions are made to define what issues will eventually
make it to the important later stages of [the regulatory process]”).
7 “The activities included in individual agency agendas are primarily those currently planned to have an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), or a Final
Rule issued within the next 12 months. However, to keep users better informed of opportunities for participation in the rulemaking process, an agency may list in the "Long-Term Actions" section of its agenda those
rules it expects will have the next regulatory action more than 12 months after publication of the agenda.”
OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, ABOUT THE UNIFIED AGENDA,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_About.jsp (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
8 CURTIS W. COPELAND, THE UNIFIED AGENDA: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 11-14 (April 13, 2015) (compiling
examples) (hereinafter, UNIFIED AGENDA REFORM,
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Draft%20Report%20041315%20
FINAL_0.pdf.
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sual.” 9 The Government Accountability Office found numerous errors in samples prepared by prominent agencies, including entries that should have appeared in previous editions of the Agenda, entries that reported the wrong date
of regulatory action or entries that otherwise incorrectly reported the status of
rules. 10 Similarly, the Congressional Research Service and the Administrative
Conference of the United States, in work spearheaded by Curtis Copeland, revealed that a substantial fraction of “significant” proposed rules was not preceded by an agenda entry. 11 Copeland’s most recent work also finds that a
number of “significant” final rules were published in the first half of 2014
without notice in the Unified Agenda. 12
Republican committee members and other observers have also criticized
President Obama’s administration for not publishing a separate spring and fall
Agenda. Instead, the Unified Agenda was released as an unprecedented single
edition just days before Christmas. 13 The spring agenda the following year was
not published until the summer. 14 Interest groups and legislators accordingly
9 Key Lawmakers Question OSHA’s Secrecy in Drafting Risk Assessment Rule, INSIDEOSHAONLINE (Inside
Wash. Publishers, Wash. D.C.), July 21, 2008, at 1.
10 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-1024 R., ACCURACY OF INFORMATION IN THE UNIFIED
AGENDA (2001). More specifically, the GAO study analyzed a sample of agendas prepared by the Departments of Commerce and Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for April and October of 1999 and 2000, as well
as for April 2001. Id.
11 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE UNIFIED AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR RULEMAKING TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION 8 (2009) (from a sample of 231 significant proposed
rules in 2008, finding that “there were no ‘proposed rule’ Unified Agenda entries for about one-quarter of the
proposed rules before they were published in the Federal Register”); COPELAND, supra note 8 at 43-44 (from
a sample of 88 significant proposed rules from the first half of 2014, finding that 94% were “preceded by a
‘proposed rule stage’ entry in the previous edition of the Unified Agenda”). In addition, out of 22 likelysignificant rules from independent agencies during the same time period, Copeland finds that “only seven
(32%) of the 22 proposed rules examined had any . . . prior agenda entry”).
12 Id. at 50 (from a sample of 55 significant final rules from the first half of 2014, finding that one-quarter
were not “immediately preceded by a ‘final rule stage’ entry in the Unified Agenda”). As for independent
agencies during the same time period, Copeland examines 20 potentially significant rules and finds that “only
7 (35%) had ‘final rule stage’ entries in the preceding Unified Agenda.” Id. at 53.
13 Press Release, Education and the Workforce Committee, Committee Leaders Request Information on
Agencies’ Missing Regulatory Agendas, (May 24, 2013). See also Hester Peirce, More Sensible Regulations
Require Predictable Disclosure (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/01/03/more_sensible_regulations_require_predictable_disclos
ure_100067.html (“The Spring 2012 edition was never released, thus breaking a nearly two-decade practice
of agencies telling the public twice a year which regulations are under consideration.”); Wayne Crews &
Ryan Young, Missing: Regulatory Transparency (Oct. 11, 2012), THE DAILY CALLER,
http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/11/missing-regulatory-transparency/.
14 Unified Agenda: 3,503 Federal Regulations, 739 affecting small businesses, SENSIBLE REGULATIONS,
(Jul. 7, 2013) http://www.sensibleregulations.org/2013/07/unified-agenda-3503-federal-regulations-739affecting-small-businesses/.
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charged agencies with playing regulatory hide and seek. 15 One accusation was
that agencies were releasing their agendas during time periods — such as the
holidays or the summer — when external monitors were less likely to pay attention. 16 Another claim was that agencies were acting strategically to keep
regulations off the radar for as long as possible. The longer an agency could
shield its internal machinations, the less time those opposed to the rule would
have to mobilize against it. Indeed, Professors Jacob Gersen and Anne
O’Connell posit that agencies often raise the monitoring costs for their opponents in just this manner. 17 Specifically, they point out that agencies can game
the release of regulatory decisions to raise monitoring costs, particularly for
those actions that are less regularly monitored such as rule withdrawals. 18
The prospect of strategic disclosure by agencies is troubling in large part
because of the Unified Agenda’s intended function: to alert monitors and interested parties of an agency’s regulatory activity before it publishes its notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM). 19 This worry is heightened given that the most
significant policy decisions may be made during this stage of regulatory development. 20 Such concerns mirror those in other contexts of potentially strategic
disclosure such as in patent filings, 21 graduate school rankings, 22 and corporate
communications. 23 Many interest groups and trade associations indeed rely on
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Big Sexy Holiday Fun With the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations,
FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013) http://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2013/12/02/big-sexy-holiday-fun-with-theunified-agenda-of-federal-regulations/
17

See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the
Administrative State, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1157, 1173–1175 (2009).
18
Id. at 1185.
19 See infra Part I. See also, Letter from James W. Conrad, Jr., Chair of Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice, A.B.A., to Boris Bershteyn, Acting Administrator, Office of Info. And Regulatory Affairs, (Nov. 30, 2012) (noting that “[T]he Unified Regulatory Agenda is an integral part of the Federal regulatory process. Its semiannual publication enables regulated entities, consumers, workers, and other interested
persons to understand and prepare for new rules that are planned or under development. As the Section noted
in its 2000 Report to the President-Elect, the Agenda ‘provides important information to agency heads, centralized reviewers, and the public at large, thereby serving the values of open government.’ The timeliness of
its publication is especially important given that the information it contains is not updated consistently in any
other fashion.”).
20 See infra Part I.
21 See, e.g., Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & Econ.
173 (2005).
22 See, e.g., Michael Luca & Jonathan Smith, Strategic Disclosure: The Case of Business School Rankings,
112 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 17 (2015).
23 See, e.g., Richard Whittington & Basak Yakis-Douglas, Strategic Disclosure: Strategy as a Form of Reputation Management, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 402 (Michael L. Barnett &
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the Agenda to monitor rules of concern. Curtis Copeland reports, for example,
that the Associated General Contractors of America, various financial industry
publications, and consulting firms use the Unified Agenda to identify upcoming
rules of interest. 24 More public consumers also include members of Congress,
the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Federal Register.25
At the same time, what is currently known about the actual determinants
of agency disclosure behavior during this critical pre-proposal phase is still fairly limited. 26 Efforts to shed light on the relevant dynamics have, until now,
mostly relied on limited samples from select agencies — hampered by the lack
of useable data with which to make more general observations. As others have
noted, further research is needed not only about why agencies would disclose
their agendas, but also how they set these agendas in the first place. 27 Agendaformation is likely to be influenced by a host of factors, including the respective
priorities of appointed agency heads; 28 mandatory statutory requirements; 29 as
well as the preferences of political monitors and external interest groups. 30
More broadly, the bulk of existing empirical work in administrative law
focuses on how agencies approach the notice and comment process — the period after the agency promulgates its proposed rule. Recent work, for example,
has examined the extent to which agencies shun rulemaking altogether, 31 straTimothy G. Pollock, eds., 2012); Jeffrey T. Doyle & Matthew J. Magilke, The Timing of Earnings Announcements: An Examination of the Strategic Disclosure Hypothesis, 84 ACCOUNTING REV. 157 (2009).
24 See COPELAND, supra note8, at 10 (noting that Associated General Contractors of America, financial industry publications, and consulting firms use the Unified Agenda to identify upcoming rules of interest).
25

Id.
26 See COPELAND, supra note 11, at 8 (noting unawareness “of any studies examining the extent to which
federal agencies’ proposed rules were, in fact, preceded by ‘proposed rule’ entries in the Unified Agenda”);
Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA’s
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 545, (1994) (noting need for more systematic study of question).
27 See, e.g., Coglianese and Walters, supra note 6, at 2 (“[R]egulatory agenda-setting merits careful analysis
and systemic study.”); William F. West & Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications
for Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN RES. & THEORY 495, 495
(2012) (noting that “[s]cholars have neglected a critical stage of the administrative process,” namely, the
agency’s “decision to begin developing a rule”).
28 See Coglianese &Walters, supra note 6, at 9.
29 West & Raso, supra note 25, at 495 (finding that the “vast majority” of rules in their sample were required
by Congress).
30 See Coglianese &Walters, supra note 6, at 9-17.
31 See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1440 (2012) (hypothesizing that since “notice and comment rulemaking has become more costly since the mid-1970s, agencies will fail to utilize notice and comment as much as they should”).
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tegically channel their efforts into other policymaking forms, 32 use the rulemaking process to engage particular interest groups to their advantage, 33 raise monitoring costs, 34 or manipulate the length of their comment periods. 35 Comparatively lacking are efforts to better understand agency choices before a proposed
rule appears to the public. 36
This Article uses a new dataset obtained from over thirty years of rulemaking and across a wide range of agencies to test empirically whether agencies
strategically disclose on the Unified Agenda. Uniquely, the dataset draws directly from the Federal Register, which is the government’s “official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and organizations.” 37 Since agencies must publish in its pages for their rules to gain legal
effect, the Federal Register provides the most comprehensive look possible at
agencies’ rulemaking behavior. 38 By contrast, virtually all contemporary empirical work on bureaucratic behavior relies on agencies’ self-reporting in the Uni32 See generally, Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Edward H. Stiglitz, Expertise and Agencies Choices over Policymaking Form: The Strategic Substitution Effect (unpublished manuscript) (Oct.. 30, 2011) (on file with
author).
33 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444 (1989)
[hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process]; Mathew R. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-71
(1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments]; Mathew D. McCubbins &
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
34 See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1174.
35 Rachel Augustine Potter, Procedural Politicking: Agency Risk Management in the Federal Rulemaking
Process (Empirical Stud. Rulemaking Conf./Univ. Wis., Madison, Wis.), Feb. 20, 2015, at 2.
36 Note that this gap in the literature is matched by a gap in the law: very little of administrative law addresses the phase of a rulemaking process in which agencies, in fact, make fundamental choices about the contents
of rules. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1137, 1140 (2014) (arguing that “the actual workings of the administrative state have increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the APA and classic judicial decisions that followed”).
37 About Federal Register,U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_federal_register.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
38 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012). Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait
of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 928 (2008) (“Publication in the Federal Register is
the official means of notifying the public of new regulations, and agency activity cannot be hidden if agencies
expect anyone to comply with their rules.”); Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping and the Federal Register:
An Analysis of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 41
ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989) (“Agency documents that fall within the provisions of the publication rule of
section 552(a)(1)(D) and are not so published are ineffective against a party without actual notice.”). As we
will discuss, while agencies face little consequence for omitting entries from the Unified Agenda, they are
legally required to publish their proposed and final rules in the Federal Register short of providing actual
notice to the relevant parties.
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fied Agenda, 39 which our results suggest is substantially under inclusive. One
hope is that this dataset improves the current state of the art.
Our empirical results reveal three main findings. First, agencies only report, on average, about 28 percent of their proposed rules. In other words,
roughly 72 percent of proposed rules are not contained in the Unified Agenda.
Second, this underreporting is sensitive to the congressional oversight environment, especially for those rules that are likely to be more substantial. In particular, when the President and Congress are from different parties, executive agencies are less likely to publicly report their planned regulatory activities.
Notably, this effect does not seem to hold for independent agencies, over which
the president has less control. Third, and relatedly, there is little evidence of
strategic disclosure with respect to the President. Our evidence is tentative here,
but even when agency heads are expected to have different policy preferences
from the President, they do not appear to strategically hide their rules from the
Unified Agenda. We suspect this is due in part to the President’s superior ability, relative to Congress, to obtain information about regulatory development
through more informal means of communications within the executive branch.
Perhaps the most important normative implication of our findings is that
39 See O’Connell, supra note 36, at 927 n. 108 (noting that “[a]lthough they provide a critical perspective on
the administrative state, the Unified Agenda are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”). For examples
of studies relying on the Unified Agenda database, see, Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule
Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS, 187-206
(George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds. 2003); Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House
Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and ‘OIRA Avoidance’ in the Agencies, 43 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 443 (2013); Steven J. Balla, Political Control, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Public Commenting on
Agency Regulations, PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2014); Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The
Contours of Public Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 59, 70 (2005)
(noting that “the use of the Unified Agenda ensures that the set of rulemakings under study represents as
complete a snapshot as possible of [Department of Transportation rulemaking activities]”); Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285 (2013); Gersen & O'Connell,
supra note 17, at 1177; Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 780-81 (2008); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight:
The Durability of the Midnight Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1454-55 (2005); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1007-08 (2011); Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s
Periodic Review Requirement-And Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199,
1217-19 (2006); Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the
Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 400-01 (2007); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137,
156 (2014); Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 123-36; Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying:
Pre-proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY
373, 379 (2012); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic
Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 261, 267-68 (2006).
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Congress currently lacks an effective information-forcing mechanism with
which to monitor agencies before they release their proposed rules. The existing
mechanism becomes even less reliable when it arguably matters the most: when
Congress and the President are from different political parties. For the same
reason, there is also no dependable means for interest groups to alert resourceconstrained legislative committees before the rule is proposed.40 The phenomenon also raises the possibility that agencies could skew which interest groups
will mobilize in reaction to their proposed rules. Agencies might do this by selectively disclosing those regulations that will benefit its mission-oriented constituents, while hiding those that will rally their detractors. These dynamics, in
turn, raise additional concerns about the extent to which less well-resourced
groups that lack access to agency decision-making through informal means can
meaningfully participate in the regulatory process. 41
Part I provides background on the Unified Agenda and a motivating theory
for the monitoring function that it serves for political overseers and interest
groups. Part II, in turn, presents our empirical findings on the extent to which
agencies disclose their regulatory activities strategically with respect to congressional oversight. In light of the resulting normative concerns, Part III suggests some ameliorative legislative responses. Specifically, Congress could
amend the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to require that agencies issue
judicially enforceable advance notices of proposed rulemaking with a good
cause exception, or else narrow the logical outgrowth doctrine. Such reforms
could help to restore the ability of political monitors and interest groups to participate more meaningfully in the regulatory development process.

I. MONITORING REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
Both Congress and the President have issued a number of statutes and executive orders that, together, mandate agencies to disclose their planned regulatory activities for the upcoming year. This Part provides background for these
disclosure requirements and grounds them in a well-known theory regarding the
function of administrative procedures — ensuring that political actors can monitor the regulatory development process.
40 See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 31 at 175-76.
41 See Krawiec, supra note 5 at 77-78; Wagner et al., supra note 2 at 106-109.
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A. Monitoring Function
Presidents and Congress face a common dilemma. They need agencies to
carry out important public policies, but agencies have superior information for
how to do so. Executive and legislative overseers, in other words, suffer from
an information asymmetry. As a result, there is a danger that the agency’s preference will prevail over those of democratically-elected representatives. Moreover, the technical nature of many regulations, along with the sheer volume of
rules produced, render it challenging for political principals to know what is
happening in the bureaucracy, much less to influence or control it.
Under a familiar view developed by three positive political theorists collectively known as “McNollgast,” 42 administrative procedures represent one solution to this information problem. Perhaps most centrally, the APA’s noticeand-comment process forces agencies to reveal their contemplated regulations
before imposing final versions of them. Congress can thus intervene in a timely
manner, whether through hearings, budgetary threats or other forms of influence. Note that Congress itself does not have to actively monitor the agencies.
Instead, it can shift these monitoring costs onto motivated third parties. These
regulated entities and interest groups, in turn, can use public notices of proposed rulemakings to alert sympathetic legislative committee members of problematic rules. They may do so through various avenues, such as constituent letters, protests, or lobbying. 43
One wrinkle in this story, however, is the common view that, in practice,
many substantive policy decisions happen before the agency publishes the notice of proposed rulemaking. 44 Although this account is contested, 45 interest
42 See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 33, at 244; McNollgast, Structure
and Process, supra note 33, at 442.
43 McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 33, at 254.
44
See infra Part I.B.
45 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Keynote Address at the Brookings Institution: The Future of E-rulemaking: Promoting Public Participation and Efficiency. (Nov. 30, 2010) (arguing that “proposed rules are a way of obtaining comments on rules and the comments are taken exceedingly seriously”). Part of the challenge in assessing these divergent views is that it is not clear that the accounts share a common baseline. Sunstein may
be right that agencies take the comments seriously, and the reports of interest groups may also be right that
most of the substantive decisions occur before the notice. For example, suppose that 80 percent, in some relevant sense, of the eventual rule is “determined” before the notice and that 20 percent is responsive to comments. In this scenario, observing that agencies take comments seriously does not undermine the view that
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groups report regarding proposed rules as a “done deal,” noting that there is less
“wiggle room” for revisions once the NPRM appears. 46 Similarly, former general counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Don Elliott has
likened the comment process to Kabuki theater, a “highly stylized process for
displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes
place in other venues.” 47 Notice-and-comment, in this view, is simply a formality used to ratify decisions that have already been made by the agency or
negotiated during executive review. 48 The available empirical evidence on the
issue is mixed. Some small-sample studies find that rules change from proposal
to final stage sufficiently enough to conclude that the notice-and-comment process is consequential. 49 Other efforts, also based on small samples, find that the
changes are minor — such as semantic changes or revised effective dates —
and thus do not implicate central policy choices already made in the proposed
rule. 50
The magnitude of the changes wrought by the notice-and-comment process may thus still be an open question, but what is important for our purposes
are the incentives agencies currently have to release close-to-final proposed
rules. 51 Perhaps the most consequential development has been how courts have
determined what constitutes adequate notice under the APA. Specifically,
courts require final rules to be a “logical outgrowth” of the notice of proposed
most fundamental policy choices occur prior to notice, and observing that a rule is a “done deal,” in a manner,
prior to notice does not undermine the view that agencies take the comment process seriously.
46 Sara Rinfret, Changing the Rules: Interest Groups and Federal Environmental Rulemaking 166 (Aug. 13,
2009) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Northern Arizona University) (on file with authors). See also,
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING 195-96 (4th ed. 2011) (reporting results from
a survey of interest group participants, showing that they perceive pre-notice contacts to be most effective in
influencing rule development).
47 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
48 See Simon F. Haeder & Susan Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 507, 518 (2015) (finding evidence that
lobbying by business groups, but not public interest groups, results in changes during OIRA regulatory review).
49 See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and the Political Control of the Bureaucracy,
92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 663-673 (1998); Susan W. Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: Assessing the Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking. 16 J. PUBLIC ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY, 103, 103-124 (2006).
50 See, e.g., Marissa M. Golden, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard? 8 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY, 245, 245-270 (1998); West, supra note 1, at 68.
51 See Lisa Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (2007)
(noting that the APA “no longer serves the informational function contemplated by its drafters; indeed,
“[a]lthough the APA reflects a political compromise, the Court has not understood it as restricted to the original bargain — that is, as providing serious constraints only for formal adjudication and not for other forms of
agency action.”)
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rulemaking. In essence, this requirement mandates that an agency’s final rule
must have been reasonably foreseeable by interested parties. 52 A rule will correspondingly be set aside if “interested parties would have had to divine the
agency’s unspoken thoughts, because the final rule was surprisingly distant
from the proposed rule.” 53 The notice of proposed rulemaking, that is, must be
detailed and specific enough to alert potential commentators that their interests
are at stake. A number of recent D.C. Circuit cases suggest that the doctrine is
still alive and well. 54
At the same time, courts have required agencies to disclose in their notices
the key data and studies they relied upon to formulate their proposals.55 Consequently, the function of the proposal has evolved from genuinely providing notice to the public about contemplated regulatory actions to, instead, creating a
rulemaking record suitable for judicial review.56 The purpose of the proposed
rule, in other words, is no longer to invite public comments and to gather information on a contemplated rulemaking.
Rather, it is the opening salvo in anticipated litigation on what is increasingly likely to amount to the final rule.57 Resulting from these dynamics is an
increased pressure on agencies to shift their actual information gathering to before the notice-and-comment period to reduce the litigation risks arising from
the rulemaking record. 58

52 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task
Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
53 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54 See, e.g., Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2005); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1083, (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ass'n of Private Sector Colleges & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
agency must provide all information material to its proposal in order to facilitate adequate public comment).
See also MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 46-49
(1988) (discussing ways in which courts required agencies to create record to facilitate interest group involvement and eventual review).
56 See Elliott, supra note 45, at 1492, (“What was once (perhaps) a means for securing public input into
agency decisions has become today primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial review.”).
57 See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 899
(2007); Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 110 (noting that “if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must essentially be in final form at the proposed rule stage”).
58 Id. at 110-11.
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B. The Unified Agenda
Against this backdrop, it is understandable, then, that political principals
would search for alternative means to become informed about what agencies
are contemplating before they release their proposed rules. Indeed, One way to
understand pre-proposal notification requirements like the Unified Agenda is as
a legislative and executive branch substitute for the APA. Because the APA’s
judicialization has blunted the information-forcing value of the statute, regulatory agendas represent an effort by political overseers to reassert their ability to
monitor agency rule development. By granting interest groups early notice
about regulations on the radar, such groups can, once again, help political principals to monitor the bureaucracy effectively.
Political principals benefit from pre-notice information in several ways.
First, such information facilitates relatively low-cost interventions into the
rulemaking process. During the early stages of regulatory development, overseers may induce agency responsiveness with modest and low-visibility interventions such as informal meetings or staff-level phone calls that are less effective
once the agency has published an NPRM. Second, McNollgast points out that if
agencies are allowed to present Congress or the President with a fait accompli,
agencies may be able to design the rule to upset legislative coalitions that might
otherwise oppose the regulation. 59 Hence, early warning systems are critical for
allowing intervention before the agency has developed a rule that can pick off
members of such alliances. 60
President Carter first ordered the publication of a semi-annual regulatory
agenda in 1978 to give the public “adequate notice” of “significant” regulations
that were “under development or review” at executive agencies. 61 What counted
as “significant” under the order was left to agency discretion but included the
consequences and burdens of a rule on individuals, businesses, and state and
local governments. 62 For these rules, agencies were not expected to provide
precise timetables of predicted rulemakings but rather enough information to
59 McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 33, at 434-44; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1163
(noting that strategic agency behavior “can allow the monitored to choose the monitors”).
60 Id.
61 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,661 (Mar. 24,1978).
62 Id..

13

describe the essential substance of a contemplated agency action.63
Two years later, Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(“RFA”). 64 The Act’s legislative history suggests that the statute was intended
only to supplement the executive order. Its narrower aim was to require agencies to consider the impact of their regulations on small businesses and to improve public participation accordingly. 65 The statute also extended the agenda
requirement to independent regulatory agencies, 66 mandating that all agencies
publish an annual regulatory agenda in October and April for rules “likely to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” 67
The agendas had to contain an “approximate schedule” for the agency action. 68
Agencies were then called upon to send these agendas to the Small Business
Administration (SBA) for comment, as well as to other representatives of small
businesses. 69 In this manner, while the executive order granted agencies substantial discretion in terms of when and what to publish, the new statute heightened the substantive and timing requirements for those regulations salient to
small businesses.
Shortly after the RFA was passed, President Reagan revoked Carter’s executive order and issued his own. 70 Among other things, Reagan’s order expanded the RFA by requiring both independent and executive agencies to submit agenda items for all proposed regulations that agencies expected to issue,
not just those expected to impact small businesses. 71 These requirements were
later reinforced by President Clinton’s own executive order, which similarly required all agencies to “prepare an agenda of all regulations under development
or review.” 72 The order further charged the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) with specifying the “time and manner” in which the Unified
63 Id. (“At a minimum, each published agenda shall describe the regulations being considered by the agency,
the need for and the legal basis for the action being taken, and the status of regulations previously listed on
the agenda.”).
64 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012).
65 S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 1-2 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2788-89.
66 Id at 2.
67 § 601(a)(1).
68 5 U.S.C. § 602(c)(2) (1980).
69
5 U.S.C. § 602(b), (c).
70 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
71 Id. § 5(a).
72 Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Each agenda entry, in turn, is required to contain
“a regulation, identifier number, a brief summary of the action, the legal authority for the action, any legal
deadline for the action, and the name and telephone number of a knowledgeable agency official.” Id.
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Agenda was compiled. 73 In recent years, OIRA has issued calls for data anywhere from three to six months before the Unified Agenda’s publication; many
agencies, however, begin to prepare their agenda entries beforehand, while others update them after submission, and even publication, deadlines. 74
These agenda entries usually include the agency’s name, a short description of the rule along with its title, as well as the agency’s priority designations — roughly, whether the agency believes the action to be nonsignificant, significant, or economically significant. 75 The entries also provide
the legal basis for the rule, an agency contact, an estimated schedule for the
rulemaking, and whether the rule is expected to affect various interests such as
states, small businesses, or other countries. Finally, upon its first appearance in
the Unified Agenda, each rule is also assigned a Regulation Identifier Number
(RIN), which is designed to allow the public to track the entry through the various stages of the rulemaking process. 76 A sample Unified Agenda entry can be
found in Appendix A. After agencies submit their draft agendas, OIRA may
then send comments or questions back to the agency regarding the content or
anticipated timing of regulations. 77 For the most part, OIRA’s review is highly
deferential and generally allows agencies to determine the final content. 78
73

Id.
74 COPELAND, supra note 8, at 23-24.
75 More specifically, agencies can prioritize the rule as: (1) “Economically Significant”; (2) “Other Significant” “[t]his category “includes rules that the agency anticipates will be reviewed under Executive Order
12866 or rules that are a priority of the agency head”); (3) “Substantive, Non-significant” “a rulemaking that
has substantive impacts but is neither Significant, nor Routine and Frequent, nor Informational/Administrative/Other”); (4) “Routine and Frequent” “a specific case of a multiple recurring application of
a regulatory program in the Code of Federal Regulations and that does not alter the body of the regulation”;
or (5) “Informational/Administrative/Other” “[a] rulemaking that is primarily informational . . . but that the
agency places in the Unified Agenda to inform the public of the activity”). REGULATORY INFO. SERV.
CTR., INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY
ACTIONS (2011), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201110/Preamble_8888.html.
76
Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, How to Use the Unified Agenda, available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_HowTo.jsp
77 See id, at 25-26.
78 Id. See also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1179 (2012) (observing that while “[t]his planning process affords OIRA several opportunities to identify regulations that might implicate the jurisdiction or interests of other agencies, and to intervene to help ensure that such actions are consistent and coordinated . . . [i]t is not clear, however, whether in
practice OIRA spends significant resources on such tasks”); Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and
Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 111 (2011) (as a former OIRA administrator, opining that the
regulatory agenda “process itself has become more of a paper exercise than an analytical tool”).
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Notably, neither the congressional enactments nor executive orders create
legally enforceable rights. The original RFA explicitly precluded judicial review, 79 while later amendments subject some sections to judicial review but
still exclude the provisions pertaining to regulatory agenda requirements. 80 The
current statutory regime is clear that agencies are not precluded from “acting on
any matter not included” in their agenda, nor are agencies required to consider
any listed matters. 81 The Reagan and Clinton executive orders similarly explicitly preclude the creation of any legally enforceable rights.82 Courts will thus
not set aside an agency rule for failing to appear in the Unified Agenda. 83 This
observation is important as it grants a substantial degree of freedom into agencies’ decisions over whether to report their activity to the Unified Agenda. Doing so does not commit agencies to issue the listed rule; more importantly for
our purposes, an agency’s failure to report a planned rule to the Agenda does
not jeopardize the legal status of the eventual rule.

II. STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE
Given the discretion agencies possess to disclose a contemplated rule, this
Part examines what incentives agencies face to disclose during the pre-proposal
period. These motivations, in turn, generate hypotheses that we test against a
novel dataset drawn from the Federal Register.

A. Deciding to Disclose
Once an agency has determined its regulatory agenda, it faces a tradeoff
when deciding whether to disclose that agenda. On the one hand, disclosure allows agencies to avoid potential reprisals from political overseers for failing to
comply with reporting requirements; these rebukes include not only legislative
79 5 U.S.C. § 611 (Supp. IV 1980) (”Except as otherwise provided in [an inapplicable subsection], any determination by an agency concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any action of
the agency shall not be subject to judicial review.”) See Paul Verkuil, A Critical Guide to RFA, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 213, 259-62 (1982) (describing the legislative history of the RFA and implications for judicial review).
80 See id.. More specifically, the1996 Amendments made certain provisions of the RFA subject to judicial
review, but excluded the relevant regulatory agenda provisions at 5 U.S.C. § 602 (2000). See Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. 104-121 (1996), § 242, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2000).
81

5 U.S.C. §602(d).
82 Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993)
83 One possible path might be to appeal to common law reliance interests. See Groseclose, supra note 26, at
527. However, there are no cases suggesting such a remedy, id., and we see dim prospects for the success of
any such challenge.
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hearings, but also potentially novel and onerous judicially enforceable procedures, along the lines Congress routinely threatens to impose on agencies. 84 So
the agency must pick and choose which rules to report and which not to report.
An agency will therefore use its “budget” for non-compliance on the rules most
likely to benefit the agency. One of these benefits is that agencies can use disclosure to appease interest groups with promises — both credible and hollow
— of future reforms. After a number of high-profile shooting deaths, for example, the Department of Justice announced in the Unified Agenda its plans to issue a rule that would bar more groups from owning guns — a move celebrated
by gun control advocates. 85
On the other hand, disclosure is also costly to the agency. It can invite
greater opposition, as evidenced by the National Rifle Association’s heated reaction to the DOJ disclosure. 86 Opposition can come not only from interest
groups, but also the agency’s political overseers with divergent preferences. Indeed, agency goals may depart from those of the President or Congress for numerous reasons. Administrators and civil servants may be captured by narrow
interest groups, thus resulting in mutually beneficial special favors. 87 More recent work also identifies regulators’ incentives to signal valuable human capital
or else expand the market for their post-government services. 88 For any of these
reasons, agencies may seek regulatory (or deregulatory) policies that are at odds
with congressional or executive desires.
As a result, agencies confront the risk of having their policy decisions opposed by Congress, while executive agencies face this risk with respect to the
84 See infra Part III.
85 See, e.g., Dave Boyer, Obama Intent to Toughen Gun Laws, With or Without Congress’ Help, WASH.
TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/21/after-south-carolina-obamaintent-on-gun-restricti/?page=all (citing the DOJ’s “disclosure . . . in the administration’s Unified Agenda, a
semiannual publication of proposed rules that the government intends to implement”), ; Matt Vespa, Good
News: DOJ Says New Gun Regulations Are Coming In November, TOWNHALL (May 31, 2015),
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2015/05/31/good-news-doj-says-new-gun-regulations-are-coming-innovember-n2006276.
86 Obama's "Unified Agenda" of Regulatory Objectives Causes Fear, Confusion, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Ins. for
Legis. Action (June 5, 2015), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150605/obamas-unified-agenda-ofregulatory-objectives-causes-fear-confusion.
87 See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. (Special Issue) 167, 169 (1990) (discussing the “special interest . . .
theory of regulatory behavior, which describes actors in the regulatory process as having narrow, selfinterested goals—principally job retention or the pursuit of reelection, self-gratification from the exercise of
power, or perhaps postofficeholding personal wealth”).
88 For a summary of this literature, see Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1265, 1267-69 (2015).
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President as well. Congress, for its part, can always override a rule by amending the authorizing statute. Similarly, it can also veto the rule through the Congressional Review Act, which like a statutory amendment, would also require
presidential assent. 89 Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, Congress could
intervene through a variety of less costly tools: for example, refusing to grant
an agency any funds to enforce the rule, or subjecting the agency head to bruising oversight hearings. 90 The President, for his part, also has multiple tools of
agency influence. He could, for example, attempt to exercise directive authority
over his appointed agency head, or more likely, assert supervisory power
through a review process coordinated by OIRA. 91 By presidential order, executive agencies must submit to OIRA “significant” regulatory actions for review,
defined as those “likely to result in a rule” that meets at least one of several criteria, such as having “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more,” or raising “novel legal or policy issues.” 92 During this review, OIRA
could negotiate revisions to the rule, send the regulation back to the agency
through a return letter or else encourage a withdrawal. 93 For particularly recalcitrant agency heads, the President could threaten removal as well.
Any of these outcomes is costly to the agency. Such interventions
can upset months or years of work formulating the regulatory proposal. 94 The
effort required to engage with legislative or White House staff is expensive as
well. Because administrative agencies invest considerable resources in formulating their proposed rules, they have an interest in preserving their major poli89 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006). That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a copy of every
new final rule and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability Office. Id. at §
801(a)(1)(A) & (B). Within a sixty day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures to pass a joint
resolution of disapproval overturning the rule. Id. at § 801(a)(3)(B). To date, however, the statute has been
used only once in over a decade to invalidate a rule. That rule was the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in March 2001, “an action that some believe to be unique to the circumstances of its passage.” MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW
OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A
DECADE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT OF CONGRESS 6 (2008). At the same time, however, Congress
has passed joint resolutions of disapproval in recent years, setting up visible vetoes by the President. See, e.g.,
Gregory Korte, Obama Vetoes Attempt to Kill Clean Water Rule, USA Today (Jan. 19, 2015),
http://usat.ly/1V73Q55.
90 See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84–90 (2006). See id. at
124–127.
91 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277-78 (2001).
92 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641-42 (1994). For a discussion of how OIRA treats this determination, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850-54 (2012).
93 Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1846–47.
94 See West, supra note 1, at 416.
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cy decisions in the final rule. They will thus undertake strategies designed to
preserve this bureaucratic autonomy by minimizing the probability of having
their proposed rules watered down or effectively reversed.
One of these strategies involves the agency’s decision whether or not to
disclose a rule on its regulatory agenda. Our initial objective below is to determine the extent to which agencies fail to disclose their rulemaking efforts before they formally propose the rule. Such failures deprive the public of the opportunity to get involved in the formulation of the notice of proposed
rulemaking, which contains policy choices that are difficult to later reverse
without a complete withdrawal. Once the rule has been proposed, however, the
public now has notice that the agency is engaged in a rulemaking effort. At the
same time, many rules issue without prior notice — for example, rules promulgated pursuant to the APA’s “good cause” or other exceptions. Disclosure of
these rules would be valuable to explore, as we hope to in future work, 95 but for
now, empirical evidence seems to suggest that most of such actions “involve
administrative or technical issues with limited applicability.” 96
If it turns out that the magnitude of pre proposal UA omissions is substantial, then a separate question arises as to what explains this observation. The
hypothesis frequently advanced is that such behavior is strategic in nature —
that is, manipulated by agencies seeking to avoid the potential costs of having
their rules challenged by overseers. Agencies that reveal their contemplated
regulatory actions increase the probability that political monitors with divergent
views will attempt to revise or otherwise block their rules. Disclosing a rule
lowers their monitoring costs, thus making it easier for those with adverse interests to intervene in the agency’s proposed rulemaking. A central hypothesis
thus emerges: the more an agency expects to have different preferences from its
monitors, the more likely the agency is to hide the regulation.

B. Testing Disclosure
To examine this main hypothesis, this study relies on a novel dataset containing over thirty years of proposed rules (1983-2014) published in the Federal
95 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(b)(3)(B) (2012).
96U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN
PUBLISHED FINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 2 (1998),
HTTP://WWW.GAO.GOV/ASSETS/230/226214.PDF.,for those final rules that are more consequential, it would be
valuable to also analyze the relevant dynamics for final rules, which we hope to address in future work.
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Register. 97 Agencies are legally required to publish their proposed rules in the
Federal Register, unless providing actual or personal service on potentially affected parties. 98 These data are thus the most complete look possible at the universe of proposed rulemakings. These data also yield a number of background
variables when available: the Federal Register citation, docket number, Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), date of publication, the name of the agency responsible for the regulation, 99 the length of the proposed rule (including the
preamble), as well as any cites to the Code of Federal Regulations or the United
States Code.
Earlier efforts to study agency activity, by contrast, have relied almost exclusively on Unified Agenda entries to capture rulemaking behavior. 100 However, most users have acknowledged — and various studies (including this one)
confirm101 — that these data are incomplete. 102 Because agenda entries are selfreported, they are susceptible to human error. Agencies and administrations
may also omit data for the strategic reasons we suggest. This incompleteness
raises questions about the validity of earlier empirical research relying on the
Unified Agenda, 103 but also presents new research opportunities. The fact that
agencies likely self-report imperfectly to the Unified Agenda allows an examination of the conditions under which an agency opts to expose its regulatory actions to public view, and whether such behavior is strategic or benign.
As an initial overview, the Federal Register data suggest that administrative agencies published a total of 65,833 proposed rules over this 30 year peri97 This window of analysis corresponds to another dataset created with regard to the Unified Agenda, which
also begins in 1983.
98 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012)(“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law.”).
99 As explained below, this is a more challenging task than it sounds, and we cannot recover the name of the
responsible agency for all rules.
100 See sources cited supra note 39.
101 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
102 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management,
Games, and Accountability, 57 L.& CONTEMP. PROBS., 185, 198 n.41 (1994) (noting that his investigation
into the quality of the Unified Agenda data was “sufficiently disappointing that [he did] not pursue[] the analysis on a more ‘scientific’ basis”); O’Connell, Political Cycles, supra note 38, at 927 n.108 (noting that the
“Unified Agenda data are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”).
103 In fact, only about 31 percent of NPRMs in our dataset appear in the Unified Agenda at any stage of the
rulemaking process — including completed action reports — before or after the NPRM appears in the Federal
Register.
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od. 104 Although it was not always possible to match these proposed rules with
the identity of the issuing agency, the remaining 86 percent of proposed rules
indicate that a disproportionately select number of agencies issue rulemaking
proposals. Specifically, the Department of Transportation (DOT) is the most
prolific agency by a considerable margin — issuing over 20 percent of all proposed rules in the series. Four other agencies issued over 3,000 proposals over
the relevant period: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with just over
9,000 proposed rules; the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with
just over 6,000 proposed rules); and the Departments of Interior and Agriculture with roughly 3,000 and 4,000 proposed rules, respectively. Combined,
these five agencies produced a remarkable 58 percent of all proposed rules.

1. Agenda Underreporting
The first descriptive question that arises is the extent to which agencies
self-report their anticipated proposed rules to the Unified Agenda. A resulting
methodological challenge is to construct a measure of agency disclosure. Because the focus here is on the pre-proposal period, the relevant outcome of interest is the extent to which agencies include their pre-proposal regulatory activities on the Agenda—that is, how often do agencies inform the public of
notices of proposed rulemaking that they later issue?
To investigate this question, we obtained machine-readable versions of the
Agenda from the General Services Administration. 105 We then determined
which of the entries in the Agenda relate to rulemaking efforts that both produced a proposed rule published in the Federal Register and appeared in the
Agenda beforehand. 106 This task required the development of a database of pro104 As explained in the Appendix, we sought to cull from the dataset a variety of Federal Register notices
that announce something other than a rulemaking; for instance, notices of public hearings, notices of petitions, notices of inquiry, and so on. The appendix details our extensive efforts in this regard, including our
attempts to validate our data.
105 These data consist of potentially several entries for a single rule, as identified by the Regulation Identifier
Number (RIN). For example, the same rule might have a UA entry at the time it is proposed, the time it is
finalized, and then again another entry as a “completed action” following finalization. See the appendix for
details on data processing.
106 Specifically, we first develop a comprehensive Agenda dataset that retains the last entry available for
each RIN; this will often, but not always, be at the “completed action” stage of the rulemaking process. These
last-in entries supply the dates, rule abstracts, Federal Register citations, and the like that we use in the analysis below. Then, for each RIN in this Agenda dataset, we determine and record the earliest stage at which it
appeared in the Unified Agenda (pre proposal, proposal, and so on). This latter variable informs us of whether
the rule appeared on the Agenda at the proposal stage or earlier.
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posed rules from the Federal Register, another dataset of Unified Agenda entries, and a method of relating entries between the sources. Appendix B describes these steps in more detail. These efforts, in turn, allowed for the identification of proposed rules for which the Agenda put the public on early notice.
The data reveal some stark figures. As an initial matter, between 1983 and
2014, the Unified Agenda reports contained a total of at most 18,303 entries
during the pre-proposal stage that eventually resulted in a proposed rule in our
data. 107 By comparison, as noted above, there were about 65,833 proposed rules
published in the Federal Register. Simply placing these figures side-by-side reveals that agencies dramatically under-report their activity in the Agenda. In
particular, agencies appear to report about 28 percent of their proposed rules to
the Unified Agenda before they appear in the Federal Register. 108 Put different107 We arrive at this estimate in the following way. First, the Agenda reports a total of 26,806 proposed rules
over the series. However, we only find matches for 19,848 of these entries in the Federal Register. That
leaves 6,958 “orphan” entries, that is, entries that are reported by agencies as proposed rules but that lack a
match in an actual published proposed rule. These entries may be “orphans” for one of two reasons: (1) agencies placed these entries on the Agenda as proposed rules, but they were never actually proposed, whether due
to change in priorities or because they never intended to propose them in the first place; (2) alternatively, our
mapping method, detailed in Appendix B, may be too inaccurate to match the agenda entries to actual proposed rule published in the Final Register, despite their existence. Under these circumstances, we proceed
conservatively by assuming that all of the “orphan” Agenda entries, almost 7,000 of them, in fact eventually
became proposed rules, and that our mapping method simply could not detect them.
Our next task is to identify how many of the rules reported by agencies as proposed rules were published in
the Agenda before promulgated in the Federal Register. The issue here is that agencies often self-report a rule
as a proposed rule after publication has already occurred. By comparing the relevant dates, as detailed in Appendix A, we find that only 11,345 of non-orphan entries in the Agenda entry preceded the date the proposed
rule appeared in the Federal Register. We cannot determine whether the 6,958 “orphan” entries were disclosed before publication given that there is no matching Federal Register entry. Therefore, once again, we
proceed conservatively by assuming that all of them were indeed published in the Agenda before Federal
Register publication.
These calculations result in a fairly generous estimate of 18,303 Agenda entries that were disclosed before
Federal Register publication (11,345 known disclosed entries + 6,958 orphaned entries). This estimate is generous in the sense that the conservative assumptions regarding the orphaned entries are very strong. In reality,
many of these “orphaned” entries likely did not lead to an eventual proposed rule, or if they did, were likely
not reported to the Unified Agenda before the associated rule was proposed. See infra Appendix B.
108 The numerator reflects the number of Unified Agenda entries that we were able to match to our population of proposed rules that had an Agenda publication date prior to the NPRM date. This measure could overstate the degree of under-reporting in a few ways. If the agency fails to record a citation in the Agenda entry
for the NPRM, or does so incorrectly, our data would not be able to match the Agenda entry to a proposed
rule in the Federal Register (see Appendix A for further details). In addition, if agencies issue multiple
NPRMs, this may lead to an overstated rate of under-reporting since only one NPRM is matched to each UA
rulemaking entry. However, this issue is mitigated by the Agenda’s observation that, based on our calculations, only 1.3 percent of rulemaking efforts with at least one NPRM feature more than one NPRM. As one
bound on the combined sources of error, even if one relies solely on the Agenda’s self-reported characteriza-
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ly, about 72 percent of proposed rules — on the order of 50,000 since 1983 —
have been sprung on the public for the first time in the Federal Register. Many
of these rules were likely promulgated after considerable periods of development and consultation with regulatory insiders.
While the sheer magnitude of nondisclosure may be disconcerting, one
might nevertheless wonder about the nature of the undisclosed proposed rules.
If the vast majority are simply informational, ministerial, or otherwise routine
in nature, their absence on the Unified Agenda may not be worrisome. Indeed,
many of the proposed rules in our main dataset are arguably minor including,
for example, airworthiness directives from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Airworthiness directives are legally enforceable regulations issued by
the FAA to correct an unsafe condition in a product and thus have limited
scope. 109 Based on the titles of the proposed rules, roughly 9,000 of the 65,000
proposed rules in the dataset — some fourteen percent of the total — are airworthiness directives.
On the other hand, if some of the missing rules are politically salient or
otherwise have substantial effect, then strategic non-disclosure is more problematic. It is clear that at least some of the non-disclosed rules fall into these
categories of concern. Consider, for example, a proposed rule on country-oforigin-labeling-for-meat-cuts, estimated to impact over 7,000 firms and countless consumers. 110 Country-of-origin labeling has been a contentious issue for
years, with supporters arguing that it enables consumer choice, and detractors
claiming that the labels are costly and misleading barriers to trade. Thus, one
would expect the public to be interested in relevant regulatory developments.
The Department of Agriculture (USDA), however, did not disclose that it was
working on a new proposal before its promulgation. 111 The agency issued the
proposed rule after an adverse World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling and the
new regulation required labels to “specify the production steps of birth, raising,
tions of rulemaking stage rather than the dates of publications—we find only about 18,000 pre-notice NPRMs
listed in the Agenda, implying a reporting rate of roughly 30 percent. The true reporting rate is likely somewhere between these two figures. See id.
109 See Federal Aviation Administration, Regulations and Policies: Airworthiness Directives (ADs), (June
22, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/.
110 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised
Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts 78
Fed. Reg. 15645, 15,645-15,652 (Mar. 12, 2013).
111 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork,
Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Perishable Agricultural commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Macadamia Nuts, Ginseng, etc., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch, by searching RIN “0581-AD29”.
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and slaughter of the animal from which the meat is derivd” in each country-oforigin. 112 It also revised coverage definitions and prohibited the commingling of
certain commodities of different origins. 113 Importantly, when USDA issued the
final rule, the agency did not materially alter any of these provisions, 114 thereby
illustrating the importance of the policy choices made at the proposed rule
stage.
At the same time, many other examples of non-disclosed food labeling
regulations abound — pertaining to claims regarding coronary heart disease, 115
gluten-free statements, 116 and “healthy” sodium level assertions.117 Beyond labeling regulations is a diverse set of other missing proposed rules likely to be of
public interest. They include, for example, critical habitat and threatened species determinations, 118 Affordable Care Act regulations relating to smallbusinesses and health care exchanges, 119 and even the EPA’s high-profile
greenhouse gas endangerment finding. 120 None of these proposed rules were
disclosed on the Unified Agenda before their promulgation.
A more systematic approach to understanding the character of rules missing from the Agenda involves taking a random sample from the larger dataset
112 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised
Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 78
Fed. Reg. at 15,645.
113 Id at 15, 645-46.
114 See Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and FarmRaised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia
Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,367 (May 24, 2013).
115 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE: FOOD LABELING: HEALTH CLAIMS; SOLUBLE FIBER FROM
CERTAIN FOODS AND RISK OF CORONARY HEART DISEASE, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2007-0206/E7-1849.
116 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE: FOOD LABELING; GLUTEN-FREE LABELING OF FOODS;
REOPENING OF THE COMMENT PERIOD, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2011-08-03/2011-19620.
117 Food Labeling; Nutrient Content Claims, Definition of Sodium Levels for the Term "Healthy" (RIN:
0910-AC49).
118 See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Beringia Distinct Population Segment of the Bearded
Seal (RIN: 0648-BC55); Designation of Critical Habitat for the Arctic Ringed Seal (RIN: 0648BC56);Listing Gouania Hillebrandii As an Endangered Plant and Determining Its Critical Habitat (RIN:
1018-YB20); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Proposed Endangered Status and Critical Habitat for the Amargosa Vole (RIN: 1018-YB32); Determine Eriogonum Pelinophilum to Be an Endangered
Species and to Designate Its Critical Habitat (RIN: 1018-YB74).
119 See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) (RIN: 0938-AR76); 3206-AN12; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
the Multi-State Plan Program for the Affordable Insurance Exchanges; (RIN: 0938-AS32Annual Eligibility
Determinations for Exchange Participation and Insurance Affordability Programs; Health Insurance Issuer
Standards Under the Affordable Care Act (RIN: CMS-9941-P).
120
See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Apr. 24, 2009) (RIN: 2060-ZA14).
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and manually inspecting this random sample. Standard sampling theory suggests that this exercise is informative. Just as taking a poll of likely voters helps
gauge the thinking of the electorate, so too can sampling observations from our
dataset help us understand what it contains. This analysis can also help to motivate further inquiries. We randomly select 200 rules from our dataset in the
post-1994 part of the series, after Executive Order 12,866 was issued; the focus
is therefore on the period for which the “significance” determination exists. 121
We then read the 200 proposed rules to arrive at a sense of what they contain,
inspecting also whether they appear in the Unified Agenda.
Most of the proposed rules — 113 of the 200 — come from the FAA,
the EPA, or the FCC. Many of these proposed rules have an adjudicatory feeling to them, along the lines of the FAA’s airworthiness directives. Technically,
these agency actions are rulemakings, but they are of limited scope and applicability. Corroborating this assessment, one informative metric is that the average length of proposed rules from these three agencies in our sample is 3,800
words. By comparison, the average length of proposed rules from other agencies is about 8,000 words. Very few of the proposed rules from these three
agencies, only about 10 out of 113, appear in the Agenda.
Many OIRA-reviewed “significant” rules do not make it into the Agenda
as well. Significant rules, recall, are defined by executive order as those regulatory actions “likely to result in a rule” that meets at least one of several criteria,
most notably raising “novel legal or policy issues” or having “an annual effect
on the economy of $100 million or more.” 122 This latter subset of rules is commonly characterized as “economically significant.” 123 Economically significant and significant rules are therefore those regulations that are of most interest to elected officials like the President or legislators. They are among the most
publicly salient. Of the 165 proposed rules promulgated by executive agencies
in this sample, we identify 13 significant rules. Less than half — 6 of 13 — ap121

President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 1993. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §
3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641-42.
122 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641-42 (1993). For a discussion of how OIRA treats this
determination, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850-54 (2013).
123See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1993). Circular A-4, in turn, states that
“Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).” See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, To The Heads
of Executive Agencies and Establishments, Regulatory Analysis (2003) (hereinafter Circular A-4), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4.
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pear in the Unified Agenda prior to publication. 124 That said, note that the
standard error on this estimated reporting rate is large for this subset of significant rules: roughly 14 percentage points. Nevertheless, the broader point here is
that a non-trivial proportion of even significant proposed rules likely do not appear in the Agenda prior to publication in the Federal Register.
A broader examination of significant rules — now using a more comprehensive but unfortunately still-imperfect dataset of OIRA-revised significant
rules — further confirms that likely-noteworthy regulations are missing from
timely agenda reporting. 125 Figure 1 reports the proportion of proposed economically significant and significant rules that appeared in the Unified Agenda
before publication. The data shown in the figure’s left panel reveal that, on average, only about 70 percent of significant proposed rules appear in the Unified
Agenda at the proposed rule stage or earlier. In other words, about 30 percent of
the significant rules proposed in our time period were not disclosed before publication. This exercise largely corroborates the findings in other studies, which
indicate that a substantial portion of significant proposed rules appear in the
Unified Agenda. 126 Focusing on the economically significant rules — that is,
those rules with estimated annual economic impact of $100 million or greater
— one sees roughly the same pattern, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1.
The reporting rate for these rules is now slightly higher at about 75 percent.

124
Some proposed rules appear in the Agenda, but after they first appeared in the Federal Register. A total of
9 out of 13 appear in the Agenda at some point in the lifecycle of the rule.
125 In order to identify the complete set of significant rules, we initially attempted to isolate and analyze text
around mentions of “12,866” in the proposed rules’ preambles, but were only able to recover about 50 significant proposed rules per year. This figure is roughly a quarter of the amount one would expect based on
counts provided by the Regulatory Information Service Center. See
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init. As a result, we instead turned to a separate
dataset of significant rules reviewed by OIRA. In relying on the OIRA review data for the population of significant rules, this analysis adopts the same approach as Curtis Copeland. See COPELAND, supra note 8 at 1719. This approach unfortunately has two main drawbacks. First, agencies do not always promulgate draft proposed rules reviewed by OIRA. Second, when determining whether the proposed rule appeared in the Agenda
prior to the Federal Register, we must rely on how agencies report the “stage” of the rulemaking process in
the Agenda — rather than comparing the date that the proposed rule appeared in the Federal Register and the
date that the rule first appeared in the Agenda. Many of these self-reported stages, however, are likely erroneous.
126
Curtis Copeland’s study for the Congressional Research Service, for example, finds that roughly 75 percent of the 231 significant proposed rules published in 2008 had a previous Agenda entry. See COPELAND,
supra note 11, at 9. In a subsequent study for the Administrative Conference of the United States, Copeland
finds that, for 88 significant proposed rules published by executive agencies in the first half of 2014, about 94
percent were previously disclosed in the Unified Agenda. See id. at 38.
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FIGURE 1. Reporting of Significant Rules

Taking a step back, it should be unsurprising that agencies report more
significant rules at higher rates given that political principals are likely to become aware of these rules through other channels, such as fire-alarm oversight
by regulatory insiders. 127 So the gains from shielding the development of such
regulations are likely minimal, at least as compared to the political costs of
agenda non-compliance. At the same time, the fact that agencies’ fail to report
at least a quarter of their most significant regulations is troubling. While it is
possible that some of these missing rules can be explained by agencies that may
issue multiple proposed rules for a single agenda entry, this dynamic would still
dilute the initial notice’s specificity and effectiveness. Selective disclosure may
also enable agencies to distract monitors from particular rules. Even those hidden rules that are not OIRA-significant may also be precisely the type where
capture and other forms of regulatory misfeasance are most likely. While these
rules have a decent chance of sliding through the system undetected by opponents, they may work substantial favors to narrow, special interests. Airworthiness directives, for example, can still be the subject of public controversy and
affect thousands of registered airplanes and their owners. 128 Thus, it is important that less connected and well-resourced stakeholders—small businesses
and public interest groups—have information about such regulatory developments through the Unified Agenda or similar means.
To this end, it will now be useful to getter a better sense of where and in
which agencies these dynamics may be the most prevalent. Consulting the main
dataset once again, 129 Figure 2 shows that reporting rates differ widely among
the agencies. The figure depicts the proportion of proposed rules that each
agency reports to the Unified Agenda: on the x-axis is the proportion of all
127 McNollgast¸supra note 33, at 250.
128
See, e.g., Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Regulatory Brief -- FAA Replaces Controversial AD
Proposal, Allows Alternative Wing Spar Inspection for Aeronca/Bellanca/Champion Airplanes,
http://www.aopa.org/Advocacy/Regulatory-,-a-,-Certification-Policy/Regulatory-Brief-FAA-replacescontroversial-AD-proposal-allows-alternative-wing-spar-inspection-for-Aeronca-Bellanca-Champion (noting
that the “proposed [airworthiness directive] would affect approximately 6,500 U.S. registered airplanes”).
129 See Appendix B for a description of how we construct the main dataset.
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rules that are reported, and on the y-axis are the agencies. The figure shows that
the proportion of rules that appear in the Agenda prior to finalization ranges
from under 10 percent at approximately ten agencies — including the FCC and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — to over 70 percent at two agencies—the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD).
It is not immediately clear what explains this enormous variation in reporting behavior among agencies, but some fine-grained accounts are plausible. Independent agencies appear somewhat less assiduous in their reporting behavior;
on average, their reporting rate is about 5 percentage points lower. This finding
may be due to the fact that OIRA’s review of their agenda entries is likely to be
even more deferential than for executive agencies. Situated in the Executive Office of the President, OIRA also possesses less information about their regulatory activities. The office is thus ill-equipped to serve as a check on Agenda
completeness. Other differences between agencies likely reflect some combination of agency culture as well as difficult-to-quantify heterogeneity in the content of rules. For this reason, agency-fixed effects are included in some of the
specifications below.
FIGURE 2. Reporting Rates by Agency 130

130 See Appendix C for a key mapping agency abbreviations to their full names.
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2. Divided Government
While agencies substantially under-report their rulemaking activity to the
Unified Agenda, this section now asks whether this behavior reflects a strategic
choice by agencies to evade political oversight. The under-reporting, after all,
might simply reflect benign considerations. Unexpected events such as mine
explosions or acts of financial malfeasance may suddenly increase the public’s
demand for regulatory action, thus resulting in last-minute, expedited rulemakings not previously placed on the Agenda. Such unexpected events may also divert internal resources that, in turn, prevent the timely preparation of agenda items. Alternatively, poor management and intra-agency coordination
failures may also contribute to what amounts to incompetent, but non-strategic
omission of entries. Furthermore, interviews with agency officials suggest that
the semi-annual nature of the Unified Agenda may prevent officials from
providing accurate and updated information. 131 In light of these potential explanations — strategic and benign — the answer cannot be determined solely from
theory, but must be empirically uncovered.
Recall that Congress possesses many tools with which it can attempt to reverse or otherwise influence the agency’s rule.132 When a legislative majority
has different preferences than that of the agency, it can require the agency to
engage in expensive oversight hearings, threaten or impose budget cuts, and
even curtail the agency’s authority. It may also eventually attempt to overturn
the regulation through the Congressional Review Act, which if successful, will
131 COPELAND, supra note 8, 95-98.
132 See Beermann, supra note 90 and accompanying text
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similarly impose costs and thwart the agency’s preferences. Strategic agencies
will be less likely to disclose their regulatory activities under these circumstances. By hiding their regulatory activity, agencies can shorten the amount of
time that interest groups and monitors have to learn about and engage with the
proposed rule before it is finalized. 133
One straightforward method for testing this hypothesis is to examine agency reporting behavior during periods of unified and divided government — that
is, when at least one house of Congress and the President are from different political parties. Because agencies are generally part of the executive branch and
because their leaders and chairmen are appointed by the President, agencies are
more likely to align with the party of the President. 134 Thus, when at least one
house of Congress is controlled by an opposing political party, it is more likely
to be hostile to the preferences of the administrative agency. Under these circumstances, strategic agencies will be less likely to disclose their regulatory activities.
The analysis indeed finds that the probability that a proposed rule appears
in the Unified Agenda decreases by roughly 4 percentage points during periods
of divided government, as reported in the first column of the top panel of Table
1 below. In other words, when the President and Congress are from different
political parties, an agency’s reporting rate drops by about 4 percent. This result
is statistically significant at any conventional level. Although the magnitude of
the decline may sound small, recall that, on average, agencies appear to report
only about 28 percent of their NPRMs to the Unified Agenda.
TABLE 1. Unified Agenda Reporting: Independent and Executive Agencies
All Proposed Rules
All Agencies

Executive
Agencies

Independent
Agencies

-0.04**

-0.04**

-0.02

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Divided Government

133
McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 33, at 434-44; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1163
(noting that strategic agency behavior “can allow the monitored to choose the monitors”).
134 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (2008) (finding empirical evidence of notable presidential
control over even independent agencies due to increased ideological partisanship).
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Agency-President Discord

-0.01

-0.01

0

(0)

(0)

(0.02)

0

0.01

0

(0)

(0)

(0.01)

Time Trend

Y

Y

Y

Time Trend (squared)

Y

Y

Y

Agency Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

56207

47267

8580

0.22

0.22

0.11

Election Year

N
R-squared

Longer Proposed Rules
All Agencies

Executive
Agencies

Independent
Agencies

-0.07**

-0.08**

-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.03)

-0.01

0

-0.02

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.04)

0.01

0.01

0

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.02)

Time Trend

Y

Y

Y

Time Trend (squared)

Y

Y

Y

Agency Fixed Effects

Y

Y

Y

13765

11877

1888

0.16

0.16

0.08

Divided Government

Agency-President Discord

Election Year

N
R-squared
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Note: ** denotes p <0.01; * denotes p<0.05; ' denotes p<0.1. Standard errors are
clustered by agency and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is an
indicator for whether the proposed rule appears in the Unified Agenda prior to
finalization; other variables are indicated by name in a straightforward way. See
note 101 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of agencypresident discord. Models in the top panel include all observations; models in
the bottom panel include only proposed rules consisting of 5000 words or more.
All models include controls for rule "complexity," i.e., an indicator for whether
the rule refers to more than one part of the CFR, and the length of the proposed
rule.

Nevertheless, one might wonder to what extent the observed strategic behavior pertains to the most significant rules. It is possible, after all, that this result is mainly driven by small or ministerial rules. While previously-discussed
data limitations unfortunately do not permit a precise answer,135 one can attempt
to examine this question by using a rough (albeit imperfect) proxy of significance like rule length. More specifically, take a set of non-significant rules with
limited impact like the FAA airworthiness directives. The average number of
words in an FAA airworthiness directive is about 2300, with a standard deviation of about 1600 words. 136 Thus, rules above 5000 words are unlikely to be
FAA airworthiness directives or similarly minor rules; indeed, over 98 percent
of airworthiness directives have fewer than 5,000 words. If one zeroes in on
longer proposed rules of 5,000 words or more — as shown in the first column
of Table 1’s bottom panel — the effect of divided government on reporting
almost doubles to roughly 7 percentage points.
This strategic effect would be expected to be even stronger for agencies
controlled to a greater extent by the President. Indeed, some existing evidence
suggests that agencies under more presidential control exhibit greater sensitivity to presidential electoral cycles. 137 To test this view, it is useful to now repeat
the analyses above, but conduct them separately for independent agencies and
135 See note 124.
136 That is, if we use the titles of the proposed rules to determine which ones are Airworthiness Directives,
we find that such identified proposed rules have an average of about 2300 words.
137 See Stiglitz, supra note 31.
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executive agencies. 138 Consider first the results relating to executive agencies,
over which the president exerts greater control, as shown in the second column
of Table 1: the top panel again reflects all proposed rules, while the bottom
panel reflects longer proposed rules. Here, the reporting rate is about 4 percentage points lower for all rules, and about 8 percentage points lower for longer
rules during periods of divided government.
Moreover, as evident from the third column in Table 1, it appears that independent agency reporting rates are relatively insensitive to the conditions of
divided government or unified government. The magnitude of the coefficient
on divided government tends to be smaller relative to the magnitude of the corresponding coefficient for executive agencies; the coefficients on divided government are also not statistically significant at conventional levels. The results
from Table 1 therefore suggest that much of the strategic behavior we identify
derives from the behavior of executive agencies. In other words, the agencies
most controlled by the President and likely to disagree with Congress during
periods of divided government are those that exhibit the most sensitivity to
Congress’ partisan composition. Independent agencies, by comparison, are less
sensitive to conditions of divided government.
As another check, it is useful to further probe this relationship by examining intervals immediately around a switch in party control of one or more houses of Congress. By isolating the analysis to these discrete time periods, one can
better control for the preferences and culture of an administration, as well as for
other unobservable factors that vary over time, such as rule composition. Because such factors remain relatively stable within an administration, at least locally around the switch in Congress, this alternative approach allows for a relatively cleaner assessment of whether reporting behavior is responsive to divided
government.
Our dataset contains several midterm switches to or from divided government. However, we will only observe a sharp change in behavior if the shift in
138 The relative independence of an agency from presidential control rests along a continuum rather than as a
simple binary distinction between independent agencies and executive agencies. Indicia of independence
could include statutory removal protections, a multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, budget
and congressional communication authority, litigation authority, as well as adjudication authority. See Kirti
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 769, 772-73 (2013). For the purposes of this Article, Appendix C specifies which agencies we classify
as “executive” and which agencies we classify as “independent.” Essentially, we use the statutory definition
of “independent regulatory agency” contained in the Paperwork Reduction Act to generate a list of “independent” agencies and categorize the remaining agencies as “executive.” 44 U.S.C.SS 3502(5) (2010).
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government comes as a surprise, because if the agencies anticipate a shift in divided government, they will smoothly adapt their behavior before the shift occurs. The most natural “surprise” shift in divided government to consider is the
one following the 1994 election, in which the Republicans took control of the
House for the first time in almost fifty years. 139 A further advantage of this particular midterm shift is that the Unified Agenda appeared late, on November 14,
1994, somewhat reducing the challenge noted immediately above.
Each dot in Figure 3 represents the proportion of proposed rules that have
an entry in the Unified Agenda; the size of the dot is proportional to the number
of proposed rules issuing in that week. Thus, we run an index reflecting the
week of the administration on the x-axis (i.e., “4” means week four of the administration), and we plot the proportion of proposed rules reported to the Unified Agenda that were on the y-axis. The figure also contains two vertical
dashed lines: the left line represents the week of the election, and the right line
represents the week of the congressional transition. Although divided government did not, as a matter of fact, begin until January of 1995, the election resolved any uncertainty regarding this fact several weeks earlier, and one might
therefore expect agency behavior to shift around the election date rather than
the date of congressional transition. The analysis thus focuses on the interval
around the election date, plotting the trends before and after this date in solid
grey lines. 140

139 E.g., David W. Brady et al., The Perils of Presidential Support: How the Republicans Took the House in
the 1994 Midterm Elections, 18 POL. BEHAV. 345, 362 (1996) (observing that “[t]he Republican takeover of
the House of Representatives in 1994 caught most observers of elections by surprise”).Another obvious candidate for a surprise shift in divided government involves the 2001 switch in parties by Senator Jeffords.
However, that switch occurred so early in the Bush adminstration—just four months in—with appointments
still underway, that agency officials had little time to develop their own rules, suggesting many of these rules
represent carryover efforts from the previous administration.
140 The solid grey lines represent locally weighted averages and smooth week-to-week fluctuations to reveal
systematic trends.
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FIGURE 3. A Midterm Shift to Divided Government
T
he
pattern
in
this
figure
is
remar
kable
and
con
sistent
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our
mai
n
result
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Immediately prior to the 1994 election, the Clinton administration agencies had
reported roughly 30 percent of their proposed rules to a previous edition of the
Unified Agenda. In other words, prior to November 8, about 30 percent of
agencies’ proposed rules had been previously reported in some edition of the
Unified Agenda up to that year’s spring edition, which was published on April
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25th. 141 By comparison, immediately after the 1994 election, the percentage of
anticipated rules appearing in the Unified Agenda dropped by about 7 percentage points. Importantly, the fall edition of the Unified Agenda that year was not
issued in October as usual, but rather on November 14th — 6 days after the
election. Thus, the immediate shift in reporting rates that followed after the
election was more likely due to behavioral changes with respect to the recent
fall edition of the Unified Agenda.
An alternative interpretation of this figure is that the change instead reflects the fact that agencies adapted their proposed rules to appease the new Republic majority. Thus, the drop in the reporting rate comes not from a lack of
transparency but rather from an increase in the number of novel proposed rules
now designed to satisfy different congressional overseers. These new proposed
rules, the argument continues, could not have been reported the previous spring
nor in the fall due to a lag in agenda preparation. In this view, agencies are acting responsively, not strategically. While our data cannot definitively reject this
theory, we believe the scenario is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, agencies are generally unable to promulgate new proposed rules so quickly as to
produce a notable effect immediately after the election. The average amount of
time that agencies take to write and develop a rule is often over a year or so. 142
Second, as previously mentioned, the publication of the fall edition of the Unified Agenda that year was nearly contemporaneous with the election. Because
agencies can revise agenda items until the date of publication,143 they had the
ability to reduce the transparency of their regulatory efforts almost immediately
following the election. Put differently, though constrained by Agenda entries
they had submitted for previous Unified Agenda data calls, agencies could
choose not to disclose their continuing stream of proposed rules on that year’s
141

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-UA-1994-04-25/html/GPO-UA-1994-04-25-1.htm

142

One challenge is that it is difficult to observe the date at which agencies “start” a rulemaking; typically
we observe only the date of the NPRM, but we know that agencies engage in extensive pre-notice activity.
For an estimate of the duration between NPRM and final action, see Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 471, 513 (2011) (finding that, between the fall of 1983 and the spring of 2010, the average rulemaking took 462.79 days to complete, from NPRM to finalization).
143

As Copeland reports, agencies may revise their Unified Agenda entries, potentially until shortly before
the Agenda is published. COPELAND, supra note 8 at 25-26.
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fall agenda. 144

3. Intra-Executive Branch
Of course, administrative agencies are subject not only to congressional,
but also to presidential, oversight as well. Just as agencies have policy disagreements with Congress, so too do they with the President. As a result, it is
reasonable to suppose that agencies would attempt to hide their contemplated
regulatory actions from the regulatory agenda when they disagree with the sitting President on policy matters. 145 Such behavior might make it more difficult
for the president to monitor agencies directly or indirectly though allied interest
groups.
One countervailing consideration is that the President, as discussed, 146 is
able to oversee executive agencies through many channels not available to
Congress. Perhaps most importantly, the President has centralized the review of
executive agency rulemaking through OIRA. He also has access to more informal means of influence and information through his presidential appointees and
a broader White House apparatus. To the extent that these alternative devices of
influence and information makes it fruitless for agencies to attempt to hide
through non-disclosure on the Unified Agenda, one might expect to see relatively attenuated results in the context of executive branch oversight.
To test these competing hypotheses, it would be ideal to have a measure of
the preference divergence between each agency and the sitting president for
each year in our series. Unfortunately, no such measure exists. 147 So our dataset
relies on a popular, but static, measure of agency preferences developed by Pro144
As a sort of “placebo” test, we also examine midterm elections that do not result in a shift in congressional control; here, we do not observe the same pattern of a post-election drop in reporting rate.
145 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1803-04,
1809 (2013).
146 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
147 Professors Bertelli and Grose produce perhaps the closest such measures. See generally Anthony M. Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress, AM. J. POL. SCI. (2011) (developing ideal point estimates for cabinet department heads from 1991 to 2004). However, as stated, this dataset only covers the heads of cabinet
departments, and excludes all independent agencies, such as the FCC, as well as the EPA. Moreover, it is not
obvious that the agencies’ preferences are best represented by the preferences of their heads, as the heads
themselves face a wide range of constraints on their behavior.
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fessors Joshua Clinton and David Lewis. 148 These scores are based on experts’
ratings of agency ideologies. Professors Clinton and Lewis survey a set of academics who study the bureaucracy, as well as Washington D.C.-based insiders,
and record these individuals’ assessments of agency policy dispositions. Under
the Clinton-Lewis scores, a negative value indicates a liberal agency, and a positive value indicates a conservative one. Our analysis takes these Clinton-Lewis
scores, and then adjusts them according to whether the president is a Democrat
or Republican. If the president is a Republican, the Clinton-Lewis scores are
multiplied by negative one, such that higher values indicate more liberal agency
preferences, and thus more likely disagreement between agency and president.
If the president is a Democrat, the scores are left intact, such that higher values
indicate more conservative agency preferences, and again, more likely disagreement between agency and president.
Table 1 above reports the results for this exercise. There, note that — regardless of which set of rules or agencies we consider — the coefficient on this
measure for agency-president discord is essentially zero. This is true whether or
not agency fixed effects are included. These findings suggest that there is little
relationship between expected preference divergence and agency reporting behavior. Greater agency-president disagreement, it seems, is not associated with
any change in agency disclosure. One plausible explanation for this pattern is
that agencies face few incentives to hide their agendas from the president, who
enjoys so many other means to obtain the same information from agencies, notably through political appointees and OIRA review. Through political appointments, presidents can ensure that central decision makers within agencies
are unlikely to adopt policies that diverge greatly from their preferred policies.
Political appointees also serve as bureaucratic informants who reduce the informational advantages of the agencies. Likewise, through a series of executive
orders, presidents have effectively set up a parallel system of administrative
law, imposing centralized review system on agencies designed to keep abreast
of the federal bureaucracy. 149 OIRA itself also reviews entries that agencies
submit for the Unified Agenda. These schemes make it less likely that agencies
could surprise presidents with fully-formed regulations written after secret negotiations with select interests.
148 Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences,
16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 4-5 (2008).
149 Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,
37-39 (1944).
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***
In short, the empirical findings above highlight the magnitude of what, until now, has been limited evidence that agencies are not complying with the requirements of the Unified Agenda. Specifically, our data reveal that agencies
only disclose about 28 percent of their proposed rules before they are promulgated. The remaining rules are sprung on the public for the first time in the
Federal Register, after which little can substantially change in the final rule unless it is a “logical outgrowth” of the original proposals. 150 It is true that many
of the undisclosed rules are minor in nature, but our data show that about 25
percent of OIRA-designated significant rules are also likely to go unreported.
Equally importantly, the data also suggest that such behavior is strategic with
respect to congressional, but not presidential, oversight. These findings corroborate other empirical work suggesting that agencies time the release of their decisions for when Congress is out of session. 151 Thus, despite congressional and
executive efforts to foster greater transparency for regulatory development,
agencies are evading legislative supervision. Consequently, the Unified Agenda
does not provide the public with the notice necessary to participate fully in the
rulemaking process.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that our findings cannot
rule out some alternative explanations for these results. It is possible, for example, that at least some of these effects are due not to strategic choices by agencies under divided government, but rather to strategic choices by the president.
Because the president appoints agency leaders and can review the Unified
Agenda through OIRA, decisions not to disclose may reflect executive attempts
to raise the monitoring costs of legislators or interest groups. 152 In this sense,
the Unified Agenda may reflect a presidential management strategy. Moreover,
it is also difficult to disentangle just how much of our results, if any, are due to
strategic behavior as opposed to responsive changes in the substance of the underlying proposed rules. Our focus on the local period around a shift to divided
government represents an effort to address this issue, but it remains true that
when new political realities arise, agencies may eventually shift their rulemaking behavior to align with those of their political overseers — say, after a
150 See Beerman & Lawson, supra note 55, at 894.
151
See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1183.
152 See id. at 1163, 1169-72, 1174-75.
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change in congressional party control. Because the Unified Agenda is only published twice a year, agencies may be unable to update their regulatory agendas
before publishing their proposed rules. Thus, what is actually politically responsive behavior may misleadingly appear to be strategic.

III. IMPLICATIONS
The analysis thus far has been focused on the causes and not the consequences of transparency. The findings tell us little about important normative
goals such as increasing public participation, much less of social welfare. Salient inquiries, perhaps to be tackled in future work, include whether greater rates
of Unified Agenda disclosure result in regulations with greater net benefits,
more public comments, or higher litigation probabilities. Without answers to
these questions, the theoretical case for transparency is mixed. On the one hand,
transparency is essential to many core democratic values: informing public debate, educating citizens, and facilitating accountability within elected branches
of government. 153 Moreover, transparency facilitates input about and criticism
of government activities that can improve their efficiency or effectiveness. 154
Access to government data may also help inform private decision-making by
individual consumers or industry actors. 155
At the same time, however, transparency also has potential costs. Transparency could, for example, facilitate the disproportionate participation of wellresourced groups that lobby for special-interest regulations. 156 Disclosures can
also harm national security or law enforcement interests, both of which require
confidentiality for diplomatic or investigatory purposes. Additionally, leaked
information may increase frivolous legal liabilities or result in unjustified reputational harms. 157 Alternatively, the information could encourage involvement
from ill-informed parties who demand unproductive and resource-intensive
meetings. Transparency could also hinder internal agency deliberations, which
may chill the candid discussions that are necessary when dealing with particu153 Fenster, 895-92
154 Id.
155 Id.
156
Id.
157 Id.
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larly sensitive or highly uncertain issues. 158 For example, transparency might
undermine collegial deliberations by forcing agency officials to publicly posture during negotiations, resulting in breakdowns of the policymaking process. 159 In this manner, disclosures could end up further politicizing administrative policymaking, thus harming important domestic policy objectives.
As a result, inquiries about whether the disclosures required by the Unified
Agenda ultimately increase social welfare or otherwise facilitate accountability
remain open empirical questions. With that caveat in mind, this Part explores
what steps could be taken to improve the utility of the Unified Agenda. Insofar
as the stated objectives of the mechanism are to allow for greater participation
and planning, the question addressed here is how the Unified Agenda might be
reformed to better accomplish these goals.

A. Legislative Reform?
Given our findings that executive branch agencies are less likely to act
strategically with respect to the President, the President has less incentive to police Unified Agenda requirements. Congressional reforms are thus more likely
to be successful than executive branch efforts at improving pre-proposal disclosure. In particular, these findings lend empirical support to recent legislative
proposals aimed at requiring earlier public engagement from agencies. Various
congressional committees, for example, have approved amendments to the
APA that would mandate legally enforceable pre-notice reporting, such as advance notices of proposed rulemakings. The Early Participation in Regulations
Act considered in the Senate, for example, would require agencies to publish
advance notices of proposed rulemaking for all major rules, defined in part as
those expected to have an impact of $100 million or more. 160 The House of
158 The story of Government the Sunshine Act, for instance, is largely one of unintended consequences. The
Act, which required agencies composed of collegial bodies to hold open meetings or public responses when
disposing of official business, undermined the ability of agency officials to deliberate in a collegial way by
forcing them to adopt a variety of inefficient work-arounds. See William Funk, Public Participation and
Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 187-91
(2009).
159 For a seminal paper making this point, see David Stasavage, Open Door or Closed Door? Transparency
in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 INT’L ORG. 667 (2004).
160
S.1820, Early Participation in Regulations Act of 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/senate-bill/1820/text
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Representatives also recently passed the Regulatory Accountability Act, which
similarly requires agencies to issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
for important rules, including basic information that resembles what agencies
would include in the Unified Agenda. 161 Unlike the Unified Agenda, however,
this early warning procedure would be judicially reviewable to the same extent
as the other APA rulemaking procedures.
While partisan wrangling is likely to prevent these bills from passing, 162 its
plausible viability spurred eighty-four law professors to pen a letter urging the
House to vote against the bill. 163 With respect to the advance notice requirement, the letter argued that there was “no justification” for the requirement,
since the existing requirement for agencies to submit regulatory agendas contained much of the same information. However, our findings suggest that this
assumption is questionable and, that agencies are acting strategically with respect to congressional oversight. Such findings could thus bolster the wisdom
of statutory advance notice requirements.
That said, a judicially reviewable requirement to issue a pre-proposal notice raises several countervailing concerns. For instance, an obvious worry is
that an agency that faces a pressing public policy problem may not be able to
both respond to the problem in a timely way and signal its regulatory intent in
advance of the proposed rule. One solution to this problem, however, is to provide for a “good cause” exemption from the requirement to issue a pre-notice
notice, with the exemption itself subject to judicial review. Another concern is
that additional rulemaking requirements would unduly ossify the regulatory
process.164 Though rigorously studying the hypothesis is difficult, 165 existing
161

See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 28, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll028.xml.

162 Of the 250 votes in favor, all but 8 came from Republicans; all 175 nays came from Democrats. See id.
Indeed, since the 112th Congress (2011-2013), we count numerous congressional efforts to revise the APA or
otherwise create new procedures for agencies to follow. See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of
Scrutiny Act of 2011 (REINS Act), H.R.10, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Accountability and Economic
Freedom Act of 2012, H.R.4116, 112th Cong. (2012); Closing Regulatory Loopholes Act of 2011, S.1530,
112th Cong. (2011); Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S.1615, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R.3010, S.1606, 112th Cong. (2011); Sound Regulation Act of 2014,
S.2099, 113th Cong. (2014); Achieving Less Excess in Regulation and Requiring Transparency (ALERRT
Act), H.R.2804, 113th Cong. (2014).
163 The Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015).
164
See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385 (1992).
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efforts to examine this hypothesis have at least suggested that rulemaking continues at a good rate despite the imposition of such procedural requirements. 166
Congress could also reassert its ability to monitor regulatory development
through statutory amendment in other ways. For instance, Congress could pare
back the common law gloss applied by courts requiring a “logical outgrowth”
between the proposed and final rules, and thus help to reassert the notice-giving
function of the proposed rule. Doing so would ease the pressure on the Unified
Agenda to serve the same purpose. Courts have been using the logical outgrowth doctrine to police a significant concern — the worry that final rules will
be imposed in ways that could not be anticipated by would-be commenters. The
concern is that agencies could keep their intended rules under wraps while proposing something only tenuously related to what they plan to release as the final rule. 167
At the same time, however, overly-aggressive attempts to enforce this
connection will discourage agencies from learning from public comments and
responding accordingly. As it stands, some have rightly pointed out that the
logical outgrowth requirement is in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense
Council. 168 There, the Court held that procedural requirements must come from
the Constitution, from a statute, or from the agency itself.169 Vermont Yankee
thus prohibits courts from inventing and imposing their own novel procedural
requirements — a proscription that has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. 170
165

The clear difficulty is that it is not obvious how to think about the counterfactual baseline. That is, we
observe agencies produce X number of rules, but we have no credible way to determine how many rules
would have been produced absent the relevant rulemaking requirements.
166
See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 31, at 1415 (concluding that “evidence that ossification generally is
either a serious or widespread problem is mixed at best, and appears relatively weak overall”); Jason
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, 261–62, 268–80 (2010) (finding
little evidence of ossification using dataset ranging from 1983 to 2006).
167 See Beermann & Lawson, supra note 57, at 895.
168 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.435 U.S. 519 (1978), See Beerman &
Lawson, supra note 57 at 898-99.
169 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 518-19, 524.
170 See Perez v. Mort. Bankers, Ass’n., 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015)(overruling the paralyzed veteran doctrine on the grounds that it was “contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions, and it improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum procedural requirements’ specified in the
APA”) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.
S. 519, 524 (1978)).

43

Applying Vermont Yankee to the logical outgrowth doctrine highlights the
doctrine’s tenuous foundations against the backdrop of the APA. 171 By requiring agencies to provide what amounts to the actual terms or substance of the
rule, as well as supporting evidence justifying them, courts have arguably expanded rulemaking requirements beyond the text of the APA itself. Instead,
Congress could clarify that agencies should only be required to provide a description of the regulatory issues under consideration, rather than the precise
text of the regulation or the substance of every regulatory detail at the proposal
stage. Otherwise, the prevailing reading of Section 553 effectively reads out the
“subjects and issues” alternative that Congress made available to agencies.
Reestablishing this more minimal notice requirement would restore the function
of the notice and comment process as a forum for genuine regulatory development with the broader public. Doing so could ameliorate the problems of political oversight that our empirical results identify.

B. Persisting Puzzles
While some of the above reforms could help Congress reestablish a tool
for earlier legislative and public regulatory involvement, two related puzzles —
raised, but not resolved here — remain. The first is why Congress has yet to
pass any of the many bills requiring some kind of reviewable pre-proposal notification. The second is why Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act requiring regulatory agendas for small business interests without making the
mandate judicially enforceable. The two inquiries are related in that they raise
the broader question of whether Congress possesses the incentive and institutional capacity, going forward, to impose legal costs for agency failures to disclose.
One potential explanation for the persisting lack of a legally enforceable agenda requirement is simply that of legislative naiveté. Perhaps statutory
171 Consider the sparse text of the APA: to promulgate rules, agencies must publish in the Federal Register a
“general notice of proposed rulemaking” that includes (1) “a statement of the time, place, and nature of public
rule making proceedings”; (2) “reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed”; and (3)
“either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”
Agencies must then give the public an opportunity to publicly comment on the proposal, after which they
must publish a “concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose” with the final rule. In this manner, the
APA’s text imposes minimal requirements on the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking. That notice must
only contain either the “terms or substance” of the rule or else a mere “description of the subjects and issues
involved.” 5 U.S.C. 553.
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drafters assumed that agencies would comply with the statute given the potential political costs of avoidance. Alternatively, perhaps they believed that the
Small Business Administration would be able to vigorously enforce the requirements, even without the threat of judicial review. 172 Our results suggest
that both of these assumptions have proven misplaced. Similarly, Congress may
have also expected the mandates to be enforced by the executive branch more
broadly, given that it had issued executive orders on the subject. However, this
expectation preceded the rise of the apparatus of presidential review — and the
many other avenues Presidents have to gain information about regulatory development. Because the White House and OIRA can now retain this information informally, the President no longer needs to enforce the Unified Agenda
requirements to meet his informational needs.
Another possible account for why agenda requirements remain underenforced relates to technological limitations. Recall that the Unified Agenda is
currently required to be published semi-annually, likely due in part to the costs
of executive branch coordination, as well as those associated with printing and
publication. As a result, the original drafters of these requirements may have
considered a legally enforceable disclosure requirement to be impractical given
the realities of rulemaking. Some regulations must be formulated and issued in
less than six months due to exigent circumstances. 173 Thus, it would unduly tie
the hands of regulators to require pre-proposal notice a half year in advance.
Considered dynamically, however, it is still curious why this state of affairs has persisted, that is, why has Congress not acted in the face of agency
non-compliance to reassert the public’s ability to monitor regulatory development? The empirical results here suggest that perhaps Congress already has
some of the regulatory information it desires: about three-quarters of the most
significant regulations from executive branch agencies are disclosed. But this
still leaves a quarter of significant regulations as well as an indeterminate number of important rules from independent agencies off the legislative radar.
It is also possible that — for the swathe of rules not reported in the
Agenda — Congress is content to conduct oversight after the agency has prom172

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 602(b) (“Each regulatory flexibility agenda shall be transmitted to the Chief Counsel
for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment, if any.”).
173
Id. at §602(c) (“Nothing in this section precludes an agency from considering or acting on any matter not
included in a regulatory flexibility agenda, or requires an agency to consider or act on any matter listed in
such agenda.”).
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ulgated the notice. However, this view ignores the hardening of the notice of
proposed rules under the logical outgrowth and other doctrines, so that it is difficult for agencies to revise proposed rules once published. Of course, agencies
might withdraw a proposed rule, revise it, and re-propose it. But all of this is
costly relative to simply influencing the agency to revise the rule prior to the
time it is proposed, when the agency might be more susceptible to congressional prodding. Thus, as stressed by McNollGast, 174 for legislators to be successful, it is important that they intervene early in the rulemaking process, before
coalitions have mobilized in support of the agency’s rule.
Accordingly, another hypothesis worth considering — the simplest, and
perhaps most correct — is that revision to administrative procedures is effectively precluded by legislative gridlock. Under prevailing legislative conditions,
a substantial majority of members might prefer to enact revisions to the APA,
only to have their wishes frustrated by any one of the many veto points in the
legislative process. Indeed, one substantial veto point is the President himself,
who is unlikely to accede to revisions that curtail his authority or discretion.
This is particularly true as the President can now avail himself of modern tools
of executive control and review, many of which did not exist when Congress
originally drafted and subsequently revised the APA.
Insofar as partisan gridlock is likely to persist — likely, in our view —
then perhaps other institutions like the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) are better-positioned to nudge reforms on behalf of the public
more generally. Indeed, ACUS has recently proposed a number of sound recommendations regarding the Unified Agenda, including suggestions that agencies engage in more automatic, real-time reporting on their websites as well as
other digital media. 175 Such reforms would help to ameliorate the ability of
agencies to cite publication delays as a pretext for non-disclosure. Because of
its unique role in “bridging” internal agency actors with external parties, ACUS
174

McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 33, at 258 (stressing that procedures
“ensure that agencies cannot secretly conspire against elected officials by presenting them with a fait accompli, that is, a new policy with already mobilized supporters”); McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note
31, at 441 (noting that “when an agency presents politicians with a fait accompli, politicians may find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond”).
175
See Admin. Conf. of U.S., Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda: Administrative
Conference Recommendation 2015-1,
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Recommendation%20FINAL_0.
pdf.
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may help to facilitate changes from within agencies, should legislative or executive efforts fall short. 176

CONCLUSION
Some of the most critical decisions during the regulatory process are made
before the agency issues its proposed rule. Yet scholars and the public alike
know relatively little about this period. This Article has examined the largely
voluntary pre-notice disclosures contained in the Unified Agenda and found evidence of politically strategic behavior. Agencies, and executive agencies in
particular, notably decrease their reporting rates in periods of divided government — periods in which they likely face a hostile congressional oversight environment. Agencies indeed appear to play “hide and seek” with the most important pre-notice disclosure regime currently available. The results are
noteworthy because they suggest that Congress is currently hobbled in its ability to monitor and influence agencies’ regulatory development. The findings are
also meaningful given that common law amendments to the APA have constrained the ability of agencies to revise proposed rules once they appear in the
Federal Register.
This Article has thus identified some ways to help restore the function of
public comment as a genuine opportunity for transparent regulatory development. Specifically, Congress could amend the APA to create legally binding
pre-notice disclosure requirements. These provisions could, for example, require agencies to report impending rules to the Unified Agenda or issue advance notice of proposed rulemakings subject to judicial review. Alternatively,
statutory reforms could pare back the logical outgrowth requirement or refine it
in ways that reduce the incentive for agencies to issue near-final rules as proposed rules. Ultimately, however, we acknowledge that the theoretical normative case for transparency is ultimately a mixed one. There is thus a need for
further empirical work regarding the extent to which disclosure affects various
regulatory outcomes.
Additional research questions remain. Future work, for example, could
extend the insights developed here to agency behavior with respect to final
176
See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of
the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1517, 1536 (2015).
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rules: what factors explain an agency’s decision to disclose its plans to finalize
a rule and how do these dynamics differ from the pre-proposal context given
that the proposed rule has already been published? In a similar spirit, what consequences flow from being included or excluded from the Agenda, either at the
proposal or final stage? Do excluded rules have different fates in congressional
hearings, or in post-finalization litigation? Does the content of the rules themselves depend on whether they are included in the Agenda? Other important inquiries are the extent to which independent agency reporting may differ from
that of executive agencies, particularly with respect to its most important regulations. Finally, it may also be interesting to consider how agencies engage substitute mechanisms of disclosure such as their own websites, published requests
for information, or announcements at public meetings or conferences.
How agencies disclose their regulatory activities has important implications for a number of administrative law’s animating concerns: who gets access
to the rulemaking process, how agencies are held accountable, and which institutions are best situated to police regulatory behavior. With a new dataset, this
Article has undertaken an empirical examination of how agencies report their
rulemaking plans and found evidence suggesting that such behavior may be
strategic. The results suggest a form of bureaucratic autonomy meriting closer
examination by scholars and political overseers alike.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE UNIFIED AGENDA ENTRY
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Source: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reginfo.gov,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201510&RIN=09
10-AG09

APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION
This appendix describes our data collection efforts in more detail. In essence, the basic exercise involves (a) developing a universe of proposed rules
culled from the Federal Register; (b) creating a database of entries in the Unified Agenda; and (c) finding a way to map between the two datasets.
After collecting machine-readable Federal Register entries from a variety
of sources, we first searched the action headings to remove “false” proposed
rules, that is, entries with variations of “proposed” in the title but that had virtually no regulatory effect. These false positives included, for example, notices of
proposed hearings or public meetings, technical corrections of proposed rules,
and the like. To corroborate this effort, we also tasked research assistants with
reviewing two hundred randomly selected entries from our dataset by hand.
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This exercise suggested that the vast majority of the entries in our dataset in
fact represented proposed rules. Of the two hundred entries, the research assistants coded only five as being something other than a proposed rule. Based on
these numbers, we estimate that 97.5 percent of the entries in our Federal Register dataset capture proposed rules, with a standard error on this estimate of 1.1
percentage points (implying a 95 percent confidence interval of 95.3 percent to
99.6 percent). Without, in addition, attempting to find proposed rules erroneously excluded from our dataset based on action headings, this suggests that our
dataset erroneously includes some 4.7 percent of its entries; that is, that some
4.7 percent of the entries in our dataset are not proposed rules for which we
should expect to find a Unified Agenda entry. These false inclusions will generally lead us to underestimate the reporting rate. However, the magnitude of
this bias is not large. Conservatively using the lower bound of the confidence
interval above, this exercise suggests we underestimate the reporting rate by 4.9
percent (i.e., 1-1/.953). That is, for example, if our estimated reporting proportion is 0.25, we can conservatively bound the true reporting proportion at 0.26
(i.e., .25*1.049).
For the Unified Agenda database, we rely on XML files provided by the
Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC) within the General Services
Administration. A single rule might have numerous entries in the Agenda, for
example, one for the proposed rule, one for the final rule, and one as a completed action report. For most of the identifying information, we retain the last
available entry for each rule, where the rule is traced through its Regulation
Identifier Number (RIN). According to RISC, a “RIN consists of a 4-digit
agency code plus a 4-character alphanumeric code, assigned sequentially when
a rulemaking is first entered into the database, which identifies the individual
regulation under development.” 177 The last available entry in the Unified Agenda is likely to contain the most information about the rule’s Federal Register citations, up-to-date abstracts of the rule, and the like.
Creating a mapping between these two datasets — the Federal Register dataset of proposed rules and the set of Unified Agenda entries — posed considerable challenges. The most obvious candidate for a mapping between them is
through the RIN, which should in theory be a unique identifier that would allow
us to trace the lifecycle of a rulemaking. However, while the UA fairly consistently contains RINs, most entries in the Federal Register do not report them. In177 http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_HowTo.jsp
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stead, Federal Register entries tend to include docket numbers, if they include
any identifier. But these docket numbers may change over the life course of a
rule. Moreover the UA only lists docket numbers in a highly inconsistent and
incomplete fashion. Thus, while we use RINs to match entries where agencies
report them, we also needed to develop an alternative mapping strategy.
The most attractive alternative is based on Federal Register citations. Part
of the information reported in the UA is a citation to the Federal Register entry
for each reported action, though many UA entries were missing these citations.
When available, we use the Federal Register citation listed for the NPRM in the
UA to match the UA to the population of NPRMs. The combination of RINbased matching and this approach produce a match for approximately 20,000
UA entries in our population of roughly 27,000 UA entries that list a NPRM.
As a result, after this first approach to matching, we have some 7,000 “orphan”
UA entries, which the UA lists a NPRM as an action for the rule, but for which
we have no corresponding match in the Federal Register dataset. Generally, this
lack of a match seems to result from incomplete data: not infrequently, as mentioned, the UA does not list a Federal Register cite at all. Other times, the Federal Register cite is erroneous (e.g., it lists a “7” instead of a “1” for a page
number). Still other times, the entry may be more phantom than orphan: for example, the agency may not end up in fact issuing a NPRM.
We have examined a number of approaches to dealing with these orphan
entries, but they all involve considerable error. As such, the main results we report in the main body exclude the orphan entries. That said, the most promising
approach we did find involves relying on the descriptions of the rules contained
in the UA and Federal Register. First, we extract the “abstract” (Unified Agenda) or “summary” (Federal Register) information from the two datasets. These
short descriptions generally consist of roughly 100-300 words that state the essence of what the agency is accomplishing in the rule. We also considered using the rule titles, but in practice found them often not sufficiently informative.
Second, we tokenize, stem, and vectorize the text in these fields in the
standard fashion. Tokenization involves taking a string of text and separating it
into a set of words. Stemming involves taking the words, or tokens, and grouping them into lexemes, or more basic lexical units. For example, the words
“sit,” “sits,” and “sitting” all belong to the same basic lexical unit. Finally, vectorization involves representing the stemmed tokens for a given string as a numeric vector, where each position in the vector encodes a specific stemmed token, and all stemmed tokens in the more general body of the text (here, rule
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abstracts and summaries) have a designated position in the vector. For example,
if the string in question contained the word, “sit,” the vector would take “1” in
the position for that word; if the string in question did not have the word, “sit,”
the vector for that string would take a “0” in the same position. 178
Third, we calculate the cosine similarity, a standard metric of the distance
between two vectors, between each orphaned UA entry and every entry in the
Federal Register dataset that (a) was issued in the same month as the UA action
report indicates the NPRM was issued, (b) does not already have a UA match
based on citations. We then retain the top 10 matches for further investigation.
The cosine similarity between two vectors is given by (A∙B)/(||A||||B||), and
ranges in this context between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more similarity between the two vectors. We then match each orphaned UA entry to the
to the Federal Register entry for which it has the highest similarity; if two UA
entries both match to the same Federal Register entry, the winner is the UA entry with the higher similarity score, and we then rely on the second-highest
score for the loser; and so on. We discard any match with a similarity score of
less than some threshold. If the threshold is set at 0.1, for example, this approach produces roughly another 5,000 matches, so that after including these
additional matches, we find a pairing for roughly 25,000 of the 27,000 entries
in the UA that list a NPRM as a relevant action.
While this approach was better than other alternatives, we ultimately did
not feel confident in the matches generated. Thus, our main results exclude
matches generated through this procedure, though we offer it here mainly as a
possible step towards a future refinement of the dataset. Regardless, we will
make the results that incorporate these matches available upon request. Qualitatively, they resemble the results reported above.
Finally, after creating a mapping between the two datasets, we must then
determine whether the Unified Agenda entry precedes the appearance of the
proposed rule in the Federal Register. We do so by comparing the date of the
Unified Agenda in which the rule made its first appearance, to the date the
agency published the proposed rule in the Federal Register. More specifically,
we identify the first time that the rule appeared in the Agenda using the RIN to
178

For more on the statistical processing of text, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING AND HINRICH
SCHUTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (1999).
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trace the rule, and then associate that Agenda publication with the date it appeared in the Federal Register.

APPENDIX C: AGENCY CODES

TABLE A1. Key for Agency Codes
Abbreviation

Full Name

Agriculture

Department of Agriculture

BOP

Bureau of Prisons

CFTC

Commodity Futures Trading Commission*

Commerce
CPSC

Department of Commerce
Consumer Product Safety Commission*

Defense
DHS

Department of Defense
Department of Homeland Security

Education

Department of Education

Energy

Department of Energy

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

FCA

Farm Credit Administration
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FCC

Federal Communications Commission*

FDIC

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation*

FED

Federal Reserve*

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission*

FHLBB

Federal Home Loan Bank Board

FMC

Federal Maritime Commission*

FTC

Federal Trade Commission*

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GSA

General Services Administration

HHS

Department of Health and Human Services

HUD

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Int'l Trade Commission

International Trade Commission

Interior

Department of Interior

Justice

Department of Justice

Labor

Department of Labor

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NRC
NUCA

Nuclear Regulatory Commission*
National Credit Union Administration

OPM

Office of Personnel Management

Other

Residual category

PBGC

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

RRB

Railroad Retirement Board

SBA

Small Business Administration

SEC

Securities and Exchange Commission*

SSA

Social Security Administration

State

Department of state
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Transportation

Department of Transportation

Treasury

Department of Treasury

USPS

United States Postal Service

VA

Veterans Administration

* Denotes an “independent” agency, as classified in the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5).
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